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ABSTRACT: This paper explores which types of firms benefit more from the R&D fiscal 
incentives and the effect of this type of instrument on the performance of R&D activities. 
Spain is considered the most generous countries in the OECD in fiscal treatment of R&D, yet 
our data reveal that tax incentives are little known and, especially, seldom used by firms. Res-
tricting our empirical analysis to those firms that do report knowing about such incentives, we 
investigate the average effect of tax incentives on innovation, using both nonparametric me-
thods (matching estimators) and parametric methods (Heckman's two-step selection model). 
First, we find that large firms, especially those that implement innovations, are more likely to 
use the tax incentives, while small and medium enterprises encounter some obstacles to using 
them. Secondly, the average effect of the policy is positive, but significant only in large firms. 
Our main conclusion is that tax incentives increase innovative activities by large and high-tech 
sector firms, but may be used only randomly by small medium enterprises. 
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RESUMEN: Este trabajo analiza qué tipo de empresas se benefician más de los incenti-
vos fiscales a la inversión en I+D y el efecto que tienen sobre la inversión en I+D. España se 
considera el país más generosos en el tratamiento fiscal de este tipo de inversión si bien los 
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datos muestran que los incentivos fiscales se conocen poco y, sobre todo, que se aplican esca-
samente. Restringiendo nuestro análisis a la submuestra de empresas que declaran conocer los 
incentivos fiscales, se investiga el efecto promedio de los incentivos fiscales sobre la inversión 
en I+D utilizando métodos econométricos paramétricos (modelo de selección en dos etapas de 
Heckman) y no paramétricos (estimadores matching). Obtenemos que, en primer lugar, las em-
presas grandes (especialmente las innovadoras) son las que tienen más probabilidad de aplicar 
los incentivos fiscales, mientras que las pequeñas y medianas empresas (pymes) encuentran 
más dificultades en su aplicación. En segundo lugar, el efecto promedio de la política es positi-
vo, si bien solo estadísticamente significativo en las grandes empresas. La principal conclusión 
del estudio es que los incentivos fiscales se aplican aleatoriamente en las pymes pero no en las 
grandes empresas y aquellas que operan en sectores de alta-media intensidad tecnológica que 
valoran sus beneficios con un efecto positivo en sus actividades de innovación. 
Palabras clave: Incentivos fiscales a la inversión en I+D, estimadores matching.
Clasificación JEL: O31, H25, H32.
1. Introduction
Evidence suggests that private firms spend less on R&D than is socially op-
timal because the presence of externalities creates a gap between private and 
public profitability (Arrow 1962; Nelson 1959). In most OECD countries gover-
nments try to solve this problem through various measures, such as subsidies or 
fiscal incentives for R&D, in order to stimulate innovation. The effectiveness of 
these instruments depends on each country’s fiscal system and the purposes of its 
programs (European Commission 2003). 
Spain is considered the most generous country in the OECD in tax treatment 
of R&D (Warda 2001 and 2002). Fiscal benefits act either on the tax base (free 
depreciation) or on the corporate income tax liability (tax credits for R&D and 
technological innovation) and apply to all firms that carry out R&D activities, 
independently of the success or failure of the project1. Given these tax incentives, 
the price of R&D is minor (Marra 2004; Corchuelo 2006), so these instruments 
should in theory stimulate innovation activities and correct for suboptimal R&D 
funding in firms. 
However, empirical evidence reveals that these generous tax incentives are 
rarely used by Spanish firms (Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros, 2008). Accordingly, 
the main goal of this paper is to evaluate who benefits from this policy and the 
effectiveness of tax incentives for R&D in Spain. The success of this tax policy 
is based on the government’s ability to design it and on the use of firms’ expected 
profit. Therefore, it is very important to understand the design of the tax benefits 
and the characteristics of the firms that use them. This means that the variable 
that explains the financial-economic profitability of the incentives (generally 
measured by the marginal effective tax credit, B-index or cost of R&D capital) 
is endogenous. We assume also that there may be a selection problem —that is, 
the design of the tax incentives may make some kinds of firms more likely to use 
them than others. 
1 Fiscal incentives for R&D in Spain are governed by articles 11.2, 16.4, 35, 36 and 40.3 of the 
Revised Text of the Corporate Income Tax Law (RD-L 4/2004).
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We find that firms with higher capacity for innovation, with a stable finan-
cial position, and that have also received R&D subsidies (especially SMEs) are 
more likely to take advantage of the tax benefits. However, SMEs encounter 
important obstacles to using them. In addition to this, when we empirically 
analyse the effect of this tax policy, we find that this type of incentives has a 
significant and important effect only on large firms and firms that belong to 
high-technological intensity sectors and it is not significant for SMEs which do 
not suffer from selection problems. Then, we conclude that tax incentives for 
R&D are randomly distributed among SMEs because those firms are not aware 
of their benefits. In contrast, large firms consider tax incentives as a possible 
instrument to capture the returns from R&D investment because it reduces its 
costs and the policy has a positive effect on their technological effort. Empiri-
cal studies that have analyzed the effectiveness of tax incentives for R&D have 
usually employed parametric techniques of econometric estimation. This paper 
uses a nonparametric approach (matching methods) to take into account the 
problems of selection and endogeneity. We also present a parametric approach 
(Heckman’s two-step selection model) to compare our results with those from 
the standard approach. 
The matching approach has been widely used in the evaluation of public 
policies, especially policies oriented to the labour market (Heckman et ál., 
1997; Heckman et ál., 1999; Lechner, 2002; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999 and 
2002; Hotz et ál., 2006). In the evaluation of innovation policies, this method 
has been used, essentially, to analyse the effects of direct subsidies on R&D 
activities; little research has addressed the effects of tax incentives (Czarnitzki 
et ál. 2004; Heijs et ál. 2006). Also, only Marra (2004), Corchuelo (2006) and 
Romero and Sanz (2007) have studied the effects of tax incentives on innova-
tion in Spain. 
Our data come from the Spanish Business Strategy Survey at the firm level. 
Since 2001, this survey has included some questions related to firms’ knowled-
ge and use of tax incentives for R&D. Our analysis is focused on a single year, 
2002, although we use variables covering the period 1998-2002. 
Our results are presented in three parts. First, we isolate the factors that affect 
the probability that a firm will take advantage of tax incentives for R&D; se-
cond, we estimate the average effect of the tax policy on user and non-user firms, 
using a nonparametric approach (matching estimators); and third, we analyse the 
effects of tax benefits on R&D technological effort, using a parametric approach 
(Heckman’s two-step selection model) in order to compare the results with those 
from the nonparametric method. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature 
evaluating innovation policies, Section 3 introduces the data sources, and Section 
4 discusses the methods used for the empirical assessment of the effects. The 
empirical results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
CEDE_45_DICIEMBRE_2010.indb   147 20/12/10   12:32:54
M. B. Corchuelo y E. Martínez-Ros Who Benefi ts from R&D Tax Policy?
148 Cuadernos de Economía y Dirección de la Empresa. Núm. 45, diciembre 2010, págs. 145-170, ISSN: 1138-5758
2. Literature Review
There is abundant empirical literature related to the effects of financial public 
policies —either subsidies or tax incentives— on R&D spending. Studies of tax 
incentives aim mainly at measuring the additional private R&D spending and the 
cost-effectiveness of the incentives, that is, whether the additional R&D spen-
ding is greater than the government’s tax revenue losses. 
Most studies have used a micro-econometric framework because more and 
better micro-data are available, and most studies have focused on the Ameri-
can and Canadian economies (Hall and Van Reenen 2000). Nevertheless, there 
are also studies focused on other countries2. Studies using a macro-econometric 
framework are scarce but not irrelevant, since macro-data allow capturing the 
indirect effects caused by the incentives, for example, the spillover effects of 
innovation between countries (Guellec and van Pottlesberghe 2003; Falk 2004), 
or other macro-economic factors that affect R&D decisions as the culture of in-
novation, the fiscal system, etc. (Bloom et ál. 2002). 
The methodology used in the literature on R&D fiscal incentives combines 
event studies comparing behaviour before and after a change in the policy (Co-
llins 1983); questionnaire surveys and interviews attempting to determine how 
individual firms respond to a policy change (Mansfield 1986); and econometric 
estimation using two types of parametric methods: impact models (Berger 1993) 
in which a binary variable shows the impact of the tax incentive, and demand 
models (Hall 1993) that directly obtain the price-elasticity of R&D investment. 
Although results are mixed, the most recent studies confirm the effectiveness 
(Hall and van Reenen 2000)3 and cost-effectiveness (Finance Department of Ca-
nada 1998) of tax incentives for R&D. In Spain, there is little evidence of the 
impact of this tax policy, except for studies by Marra (2004), who concludes that 
tax incentives affect the firm cost structure and improve the private demand for 
R&D, and Corchuelo (2006), who finds that incentives increase the probability 
of innovation and R&D effort.
Recently, parametric approaches have been combined with nonparametric 
ones in the evaluation of public policies. This approach has been widely used 
to determine whether R&D direct subsidies complement or crowd out private 
spending on R&D. In these studies, the recent concern about endogeneity and 
selection problems has led researchers to identify patterns in the distribution of 
public support and to estimate counterfactual status (Herrera and Heijs 2006).
Using a matching approach, the studies of Czarnitzki (2001), Fier (2002), 
Czarnitzki and Fier (2002) and Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) in Germay; Du-
guet (2004) in France; Lööf and Hesmati (2005) in Sweden, and Czarnitzki and 
Ebersberger (2006) in Finland obtain that, on average, R&D subsidies do not 
fully crowd out private financing because innovation input increases with the re-
2 Some examples: Lattimore (1997) in Australia, Asmussen and Berriot (1993) in France, van 
Pottlesberghe et ál. (2003) in Belgium, and Parisi and Sembenelli (2003) in Italy. 
3 In general, the median of the elasticity is -0.85, and the average is -0.81 (European Commis-
sion 2003).
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ception of public subsidies. In Spain, Herrera and Heijs (2006) and González and 
Pazó (2008) reject either full or partial crowding out of private financing by R&D 
subsidies although the second one concludes that some firms (especially SMEs 
and firms with medium-low technological intensity) would have not developed 
R&D activities in the absence of R&D subsidies. 
Other studies combine parametric and nonparametric techniques to evaluate 
public funding policy as Kaiser (2004) who uses Heckman’s two-step selection 
model and nearest neighbour matching estimator, Görg and Strolb (2005) who 
work with a sample of Irish plants and using parametric (DID) and nonparametric 
estimations (with Caliper matching estimator), Aerts and Czarnitzki (2005) who 
combine matching estimators and instrumental variables and Duch et ál. (2007), in 
Spain, who use the matching and OLS approach to analyze the impact of various 
types of R&D subsidies received by Catalonian manufacturing and service sector 
firms. All of them reject the existence of a crowding-out effect as well. 
Similar conclusions have been obtained in studies that have used only pa-
rametric methods of estimation to evaluate the relationship between R&D sub-
sidies and firms’ R&D activities as in Hussinger (2006) applied to the German 
economy; Lach (2002) in Israel; Hanel (2003) in Canada; Ali-Yrkkö (2005 a, b), 
in Finland; González et ál. (2005) and Gelabert et ál. (2009) in Spain. 
To summarize, the majority of studies that have used only parametric or only 
nonparametric approaches or both, controlling for the endogeneity of R&D sub-
sidies and sample selection problems, have rejected full crowding-out effects. 
The exceptions are Wallsten (2000) who finds full crowding out of private R&D 
spending in firms benefiting from the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) programme; Busom (2000), in Spain, who rejects full crowding out of 
private funds but finds partial crowding out for 30 percent of the firms; Toiva-
nen and Niininem (2000), in Finland, who show that the positive effect of R&D 
subsidies disappears in firms with higher cash-flow; and Suetens (2002), in Bel-
gium, who finds no significant effects of R&D subsidies. 
In contrast, there are few papers that have analysed the effects of tax incen-
tives on R&D using a nonparametric approach. In Canada, Czarnitzki et ál. 
(2004), using data for 1999, show that tax credits increase a firm’s probability of 
developing new products in domestic and foreign markets; they infer that firms 
perform more R&D activities because of the tax incentives. In Spain, Heijs et 
ál. (2006) use the propensity score matching method to analyse the effect of tax 
incentives on Spanish manufacturing firms. They reject a crowding-out effect, 
although they conclude that fiscal incentives do not stimulate additional R&D 
investment. Lastly, Berube and Mohnen (2009) have analysed the effectiveness 
of R&D grants for Canadian plants already benefit from R&D tax credits con-
cluding that these firms introduced more new products, more world-first product 
as well, and were more successful in commercializing their innovations that their 
counterfactual part that only benefited from R&D tax credit. 
To sum up, the combination of parametric and nonparametric approach in the 
analysis of the effectiveness of tax incentives and their application to the Spanish 
economy where, as we previously regarded, it is still scarce, are the main contri-
butions of this paper.
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3. Spanish Data
We use data provided by the SEPI Foundation on behalf of the Spanish Ministry 
of Industry, Tourism and Trade4. This survey contains data from 1990 on manufactu-
ring firms with more than 10 employees, which are questioned about their strategies 
in the short and long run, including their R&D decisions. Since 2001, this survey has 
included some questions about the knowledge and use of tax incentives for R&D that 
allow us to distinguish between firms that merely are aware of these incentives and 
firms that actually use them. Because of some problems with answers in 2001, our 
research refers to the year 2002, although we measure some variables for the period 
1998 to 2002. Our final sample includes 1708 observations at the firm level.
Tables 1 and 2 analyse the knowledge and use of tax incentives by firms of va-
rious sizes5 and sectors6. Only a little more than half of the firms in the full sample are 
aware of the incentives; awareness is especially low among SMEs and in industries 
with medium-low technological intensity. And of those that know about the R&D tax 
credit, fewer than half use it. If we consider only firms that conducted R&D in 2002, 
the percentages increase, especially of SMEs and firms with medium-low technolo-
gical intensity that report knowing about the tax incentives, but still, very few firms 
report using them. Finally, Table 3 analyses the average R&D technological effort 
(R&D spending over sales), which, in general, is higher in those firms that know 
about and, especially, that use the tax incentives. Whether there is a causal connection 
is something to confirm by empirical study.
Table 1.—Firms That Know about and Use R&D Tax Incentives, by Size (2002)
Full sample
Do not know Know Use
Observations % total Observations % total Observations % Know
SMEs 610 52.1 560 47.9 102 18.2
Large firms 87 16.2 451 83.8 191 42.4
Total 697 40.8 1,011 59.2 293 29.0
Firms that conduct R&D 
Observations % total Observations % total Observations % Know
SMEs 62 25.6 180 74.4 82 45.6
Large firms 41 10.3 357 89.7 177 49.6
Total 103 16.1 537 83.9 259 48.2
Source: ESEE and own elaboration
4 See Fariñas and Jaumandreu (1999) and www.funep.es for the survey’s design and 
elaboration.
5 We sort by sizes because of the special characteristics of the sample. Large firms (more than 200 
employees) were fully selected, while small ones (>10 and ≤ 200 employees) were randomly selected.
6 Sectors are classified into high-medium and medium-low technological intensity according to 
www.ine.es/daco/daco42/daco4217/lstsctcnae.doc.
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Table 2.—Firms That Know about and Use R&D Tax Incentives by Sector (2002)
Full sample
Do not know Know Use
Observations % total Observations % total Observations % Know
Medium-low 
tech
93 26.4 259 73.6 110 42.5
High-medium 
tech
604 44.5 752 55.5 183 24.3
Total 697 40.8 1,011 59.2 293 29.0
Firms that conduct R&D
Observations % total Observations % total Observations % Know
Medium-low 
tech
25 11.7 188 88.3 106 56.4
High-medium 
tech
78 18.3 349 81.7 153 43.8
Total 103 16.1 537 83.9 259 48.2
Source: ESEE and own elaboration
Table 3.—R&D Technological Effort of Firms That Conduct R&D (2002)
 Do not know Know Use
SMEs 1.5 2.3 3.0
Large firms 0.8 1.6 2.2
Total 1.2 1.9 2.5
Source: ESEE and own elaboration
4. Methods
We examine the average treatment effects of R&D tax incentives on firms’ 
R&D technological effort using two different approaches: matching estimators 
and Heckman’s two-step selection model. 
The main advantage of the first approach is that we need to assume neither 
functional form nor distribution of the measurement error term. Other advantage 
is that the matching procedure considers only treated and non treated units in 
the common support, by dropping all the controls whose variable’s value is hig-
her or smaller than that of the treated. Finally, this method reduces the number 
of non-treated to a sub-sample (the selected controls) with characteristics more 
homogeneous to those of treated units. Nonetheless, this method also has some 
drawbacks: it allows us only to verify heterogeneity between the treated and 
not-treated firms (Czarnitzki et ál., 2004); it assumes that selection depends on 
observable factors only, which in turn means that the researcher has to observe 
every relevant factor that could affect the probability of receiving the treatment 
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(Hussinger, 2006); and it relies strongly on the existence of common support 
(Heckman et ál., 1997 and 1998).
Because the matching method allows only for a binary treatment and it is 
only reliable just in the case of selection on observables7, we compare the re-
sults using a second method. Selection models take into account selection on 
either observable or unobservable variables. A characteristic of these models is 
the additive separability of the unobserved components. A failure of common 
support is not as big a problem as for the matching approach, although this me-
thod has the need of requiring some specific distributional hypothesis than other 
models do not need and the cost of a formal functional form.
In the empirical analysis, we first consider the full sample of firms that report 
knowing about the tax incentives (which includes firms not conducting R&D), 
and second, the subsample of only firms that perform R&D. We work with the 
full sample because we take into account firms’ R&D status in order to evalua-
te the inducement effect of tax incentives on firms that do not conduct R&D 
(Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2005; González and Pazó, 2008). If we judged only those 
that did, we could underestimate the treatment effect because we could not test 
whether or not a firm would have performed innovation activities without the 
incentives. 
To realize the economic and statistical meaning of both approaches, we pre-
sent a concise overview about them.
4.1. The matching approach
The matching approach is used when the data exhibit a selection bias. If R&D 
tax incentives were randomly distributed among firms, then we could simply 
compare the average R&D technological effort of the user and non-user firms 
in order to obtain the treatment effect.8 But fiscal incentives for R&D are not 
granted randomly; they depend on the government’s design. Moreover, firms at 
least are partly self-select into the treatment and their decisions whether or not 
to take advantage of these incentives may be related to the expected benefits. 
The matching method attempts to emulate an experiment where tax incentives 
are distributed randomly by comparing the outcomes of pairs of firms that are 
very similar in several characteristics. We can then compare the average R&D 
technological effort of the group of user firms with the group of matched similar 
non-user firms. 
7 We have selection on observables when only characteristics observable to the researcher are 
correlated with the treatment status variable so that, controlling opportunely for them, treatment 
effects cab be estimated consistently. Although this limit, if the researcher has a wide set of observed 
variables (as in our case) the problem of selection on unobservables should be attenuated.
8 Under the weaker assumption of mean independence, which supposes that firms’ participa-
tion in the fiscal incentives system is random, we can estimate the output by simply averaging the 
treatment and non-treatment firms (Wooldridge, 2001). 
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In the matching method, we evaluate the effect of tax incentives on R&D 
technological effort ( 1Y ) for the firms that use them (treated group, A=1), and 
the potential outcome ( 0Y ) for the non-user firms (untreated group, A=0). The 
fundamental problem of causal inference is that it is impossible to observe the 
individual treatment effect. But, under some assumptions, we can estimate the 
average treatment effect for the sample. We calculate the average treatment effect 
on the treated as follows:
And we estimate the average treatment effect on the untreated as follows:
To carry out the evaluation, we need to construct the counterfactual )1ˆ( 0 =AYE  
in equation [1], that is, the R&D technological effort users would have made, on 
average, had they not taken advantage of the tax incentives, selecting from the 
non-user firms a control group in which the distribution of observed variables 
is as similar as possible to the distribution in the treated group. We also need 
to construct the counterfactual )0ˆ( 1 =AYE in equation [2], that is, the R&D te-
chnological effort non-user firms would have made, on average, had they taken 
advantage of the tax incentives, selecting from the user firms the control group 
with the most similar distribution of observed variables. 
To construct the counterfactual, we assume that all relevant differences bet-
ween user and non-user firms are captured by their observable characteristics, X. 
Then we select from the non-user (user) firms a control group in which the dis-
tribution of observed variables is as similar as possible to the distribution in the 
user (non-user) group. We use the propensity score (PS) proposed by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) instead of the vector of the observable characteristics X as the 
matching argument. They define the propensity score as the conditional probabi-
lity of using tax incentives { }xXAx[ p 


 1Pr)( . They show that if the exposure 
to treatment is random within cells defined by X, it is also random within cells 
defined by the values of a synthetic measure p(x). 
After that, we pair each user firm with some group of “equivalent” non-user 
firms, and associate the R&D technological effort of the treated firms i, iy  with 
the weighted outcomes of their “neighbours” j in the untreated comparison group 
(A=0) to obtain [1]:
)1()1()1( 0101 




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And we pair each non-user firm with the group of “more similar” user firms, 
and associate the R&D technological effort of the untreated firms j, jy  with 
the weighted outcomes of their “neighbours” i in the treated comparison group 
(A=1) to obtain [2]:
ijw  and jiw                                           with are the weighted controls in 
forming a comparison with the other groups, untreated and treated, respectively. 
We estimate two types of matching estimators to obtain the treatment effect 
for the treated (user) firms and the untreated (non-user) firms.9 First, we find the 
outcome of the most similar control unit, that is, nearest neighbour matching10
to estimate the treatment effect on the treated firm i, and
to estimate the treatment effect on the untreated firm j.
Second, we use a weighted average of the outcomes of the untreated (treated) 
firms where the weight given to untreated j (treated i) firms is in proportion to the 
nearness of the observable characteristics of i (j) and j (i) (this is Kernel-based 
matching)11.
to estimate the treatment effect for the treated firms i, and
9 See Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) 
and Becker and Ichino (2002) for a discussion of different types of matching estimators. 
10 Nearest neighbour matching has been used in Czarnitzki (2001), Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), 
Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Kaiser (2004), Lööf and Hesmati (2005), Czarnitzki and Ebersberger 
(2006), González and Pazó (2008), Herrera and Heijs (2006) and Aerts and Czarnitzki (2005).
11 Kernel-based matching has been used by Duguet (2004) and Kaiser (2004).
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to estimate the treatment effect for the untreated firms j.
Finally, we consider the average difference between the actual and the esti-
mated outcome (R&D technological effort) to be caused by the tax policy. To 
derive equations [1] and [2] we need two assumptions given the propensity sco-
re: first, the balancing property, that is, the balancing of pre-treatment variables 
given the propensity score
where A shows the treatment status (using or not using the tax incentives); 
and second, the unconfoundedness assumption given the propensity score
If the first assumption is satisfied, observations with the same propensity sco-
re must have the same distribution of observable characteristics independently 
of their treatment status (the second assumption). That is, for a given propensity 
score, exposure to treatment is random; therefore, user and non-user firms should 
be on average observationally identical. 
We estimate the propensity score according to Becker and Ichino (2002)12, 
considering the normal cumulative distribution
where h(X) is a function of covariates with linear and higher order terms. We 
restrict the sample to common support; that is, we delete all the observations on 
user firms with probabilities larger than the maximum and smaller than the mini-
12 The program pscore.ado proposed by Becker and Ichino (2002) estimates the propensity 
score and tests the balancing assumption. 
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mum in the potential control group. Also, for both samples (the full sample and 
those firms that perform R&D and know about the tax incentives), we estimate 
separate propensity scores for larger firms (more than 200 employees) and for 
SMEs, to evaluate the effects on the outcome (R&D technological effort) by size. 
So we estimate in total six propensity scores, and then we calculate the average 
treatment effects on the treated firms using nearest neighbour and Kernel-based 
matching as well as the average treatment effects on the non-treated firms using 
nearest neighbour matching13.
To estimate the propensity score we use a similar specification from Cor-
chuelo and Martínez-Ros (2008), in which the dependent variable is a dummy 
with value 1 if the firm takes advantage of the tax incentives and 0 otherwise. 
The vector of the covariates includes variables classified in three groups. The 
first group considers binary variables for firms’ characteristics: size (D10-20, 
D21-50, D51-100, D101-200, D201-500, D>500, with value 1 if the firm is in 
the given interval of number of employees), to take into account management 
abilities (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; González and Pazó, 2008); sector (DM-HS, 
with value 1 if the firm is in a high-medium tech sector), to capture technologi-
cal opportunities; and a financial variable (financial stability, with value 1 if the 
firm’s own equity over total debt is >0.5 and 0 otherwise), to account for diffe-
rences in the way that firms finance their investment activities (Harhoff, 1998; 
Hall, 2002 and 2005). 
The second group includes binary variables linked with firms’ innovation ac-
tivities: stable R&D firm, with value 1 if the firm has performed R&D activities 
in the period 1998-2000, and 0 if it has not performed R&D activities or has done 
so in only some of those years, to show the experience of the firms (Busom 2000; 
Blanes and Busom 2004); and receive subsidies in 2002 to take into account that 
firms that participate in this type of program are also aware of other kinds of 
public support and have perfectly identified the R&D expenditures that qualify 
for the deductions.
Finally, we have considered some variables that assume that firms evaluate 
costs and benefits before choosing to take advantage of the tax incentives. The 
benefits are approximated by the variable B-index14; it represents the firm’s mi-
nimum profit expected to obtain from investing in R&D, allowing for tax incen-
tives15. The costs are approximated by two binary variables that reveal the obsta-
cles perceived by managers to using tax incentives: lack of R&D personnel, with 
value 1 if the firm did not dedicate any personnel to R&D in 2002; and lack of 
importance of quality improvements in production, with value 1 if the firm does 
not perform quality controls, quality is not the principal reason for price varia-
13 We employ the method described in Becker and Ichino (2002) and Abadie and Imbens 
(2004).
14 The B-index is a synthetic index designed by McFetridge and Warda (1983) that allows 
comparing the generosity of different systems of fiscal incentives for R&D. It is also the fiscal 
component of the cost of capital of a marginal project of R&D.
15 The variable B-index has been elaborated in a similar way of Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros 
(2008).
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tion, the firm does not perform market and marketing research to commercialise 
its product, and the firm has no design activities, and 0 otherwise.
We test16 that the variables B-index and receive subsidies in 2002 are endo-
genous, and we use instrumental variables to take the endogeneity into account. 
Therefore, we include in the regressions the variable B-index for the previous 
year, and we use the estimated probability of the variable receive subsidies in 
2002 (a binary variable with value 1 if the firm obtained an R&D subsidy in 
2002) with a set of covariates17. 
Finally, the predicted probabilities (the so-called propensity scores) obtained 
from the probit models serve as argument in the matching procedure.
4.2. The selection model approach
We compare the performance of the previous approach with a sample selec-
tion approach (as in the Heckman two-stage selection model, 1979), which is a 
powerful method to deal with the selection on observables. We use this methodo-
logy implementing instrumental variables approach as well, in order to solve the 
problem of selection on unobservables. In this case, we need to know a full set of 
exogenous variables (the instruments) correlated with the treatment variable and 
(Y), at the same time, uncorrelated with the outcome (R&D technological effort), 
in order to build a 2SLS estimation of the evaluation equation. 
The model is composed of two correlated equations, one for the outcome 
(R&D technological effort as a function of a set of variables) and one for the 
selection equation (the probability of using the tax incentives as a function of the 
previous set of variables), that takes the following form for each j-esima firm:
16 We use the Blundell and Smith test for probit models to check for the potential endogeneity 
of these variables. Under the alternative hypothesis, we regress the suspected endogenous varia-
bles on a linear projection of a set of instruments. We then include the residuals obtained in the 
model and, under the null hypothesis; exogeneity can be rejected, so we test the endogeneity of the 
variables. 
17 See Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2008) for details about the model used.
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where z and x are covariates and u and  are unobservable components (error 
terms) with cero means but supposed to be correlated. The sign of ρ shows whe-
ther non-observables in the participation and non-observable in the outcome are 
positively or negatively correlate and that, to make our results the most compa-
rable we hold z=x=matching covariates (to reduce any arbitrariness in choosing 
different sets of x and z in the two equations). Nevertheless, we introduce ano-
ther variables in the outcome equation in order to analyse the elasticity of R&D 
technological effort on the benefits (or economic-financial profitability) that a 
firm expect to get by investing in R&D. These benefits are approximated by the 
variable B-index which represents the minimum profit that one firm expects to 
obtain from investing in R&D, allowing for tax incentives.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Probability of using tax incentives
First, we have estimated the predicted probability of using the tax incenti-
ves for the full sample (Table 4) and the sample of firms performing R&D (Ta-
ble 5). In all the specifications, we have verified that the balancing property is 
satisfied18. 
The participation probability increases with firm size when the full sample 
is considered, but not when we restrict the sample to those firms performing 
R&D. Technological opportunities are not significant in either the full sam-
ple or the subsample of innovative firms. One important factor in explaining 
the probability of using tax incentives is to obtain R&D subsidies. Firms that 
apply for R&D subsidies have perfectly identified the qualified expenditures 
and can support the administrative or other costs of applying for them, so, as 
expected, this factor influences the use of the tax incentives system. This result 
shows complementarities among the public instruments to promote innovation. 
Financial stability also increases the probability of participation, but it is sig-
nificant only to SMEs showing the importance of not having financial constra-
ints to investing in R&D. In contrast, although being a stable R&D performer 
increases, in general, the probability of participation, it is significant only in 
large firms, which shows that firms with higher capacity to innovate are also 
more likely to use tax incentives. Finally, results report that only large firms 
are aware of the benefits from the tax incentives, while SMEs emphasize on the 
obstacles to using them. 
In sum, those Spanish firms that have higher capacity for innovation (Czar-
nitzki et ál. 2004), participate in other types of public financing of innovation 
18 Upon request, the authors will provide the number of blocks that ensures that the mean 
propensity score is not different for treated firms and control firms in each block (guaranteeing that 
the balancing property is satisfied) and the number of treated firms and control firms for each block 
considering the common support (the table that shows the inferior block of the propensity score). 
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activities and have a stable financing position are more likely to take advantage 
of tax incentives for R&D. 
5.2. Average treatment effects
Second, we present the average treatment effect on treated firms and the ave-
rage treatment effect on untreated firms using different types of matching esti-
mators. We have tested the full sample of firms knowing tax incentives (Table 6) 
and the subsample of firms that know about the tax incentives and perform R&D 
(Table 7), distinguishing by size. The first two rows show nearest neighbour 
matching (random draw version) and the Kernel matching proposed by Becker 
and Ichino (2002), and the rest of the rows show the sample average effect of 
treatment on treated firms (SATT) and the sample average effect of treatment on 
controls (SATC) using the nearest neighbour estimator proposed by Abadie and 
Imbens (2004). Effect tests are usually carried out by means of simple t-statistics. 
However, the ordinary t-value is biased upwards because it does not capture that 
the mean of the outcome variable of the control group results not from a random 
sampling but from an estimation (via the propensity score and the matching pro-
cedure). To remove this bias, we apply a bootstrapping method that simulates the 
distribution of the mean outcome of the control group by repeated sampling. This 
empirical distribution can calculate a standard error and, thus, a t-statistic that is 
not biased. On the other hand, Smith (2000) considers that the nearest neighbour 
estimator can operate with more than one “nearest neighbour,” and with or wi-
thout replacement, that is, the untreated firm can act as counterfactual of more 
than one treated firm. This way, we can reduce the variance of the estimator, 
since the observations with insufficient “nearest neighbours” are ignored and the 
group of possible matching firms is larger and this can reduce biases (Abadie and 
Imbens 2006). 
In Table 6 we observe that only the SATT procedure presents a positive and 
significant effect of tax incentives on R&D technological effort, either for the 
full sample or for any group of firms by size. Comparatively, the effect is higher 
in SMEs. However, the effect that tax incentives would have on non-user firms 
is not significant. 
When only firms that conduct R&D are considered (Table 7), the positive and 
significant effect of tax incentives exists only in large firms. This result supports 
the idea that only large firms are aware of the benefits of the incentives and that 
SMEs, in contrast, perceive some obstacles that impede their access to these in-
centives. The hypothetical effect that tax incentives would have on non-users is 
positive and significant in the full sample of innovative firms: R&D technologi-
cal effort could be increased if more firms took advantage of tax incentives.
Finally, we present the results of the second step of Heckman’s in Tables 8 
and 9. The dependent variable in the regressions is the log of R&D technological 
effort, and we have used the log of B-index as an independent variable to obtain 
the elasticity of R&D effort due to the tax benefits. Results are similar to those 
from the matching procedure. Only the coefficients of the technological opportu-
nities and B-index variables are significant and have the correct sign. R&D tech-
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nological effort increases in high-tech firms and when the B-index is minor, but 
the former effect is significant only in large firms. Parametric estimation shows 
that only large firms and firms in high-tech industries seem to benefit from the 
tax incentives, and for those firms the tax policy is effective. As well, the Mill’s 
ratio is not significant in SMEs, which shows that there is not a selection problem 
and that tax incentives are randomly distributed in firms of this size. 
6. Conclusions
In general, private R&D innovation is a risky strategy overall when firm face 
to higher levels of uncertainty in terms of appropriability. Under such conditions, 
firms tend to reduce their efforts investing under the social optimum and the go-
vernments use fiscal incentives for R&D to encourage innovation and solve this 
market failure. Spain’s tax policy is considered the most favourable among the 
OECD countries, but data report that it is little used by firms. We have used two 
different types of analysis, parametric (matching estimators) and nonparametric 
(selection model) approaches on a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms to 
show how the size of companies really affects the strategy to access the subsidies 
offered by the Spanish’s Government. 
Our findings are (1) Among firms that perform R&D activities, size per se 
does not affect the probability of using tax incentives, but they are used especia-
lly by large firms that can guarantee the viability of the projects and those that are 
more heavily involved in innovation activities. Moreover, tax incentives are also 
employed by firms that receive additional public financial support (direct sub-
sidies) for R&D investment, in particular, small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Large firms consider tax incentives as a possible instrument to capture the returns 
from R&D investment.. We also find that the obstacles are important especially 
for SMEs. (2) In the estimation of the counterfactual situation, we show that on 
average tax policy fosters R&D technological effort, but the increase is signifi-
cant only for large firms. We consider that, in the case of SMEs, a reduction of 
the obstacles might increase their probability of implementing innovations and 
therefore increasing their R&D spending. Finally, from the parametric analysis 
we confirm that the tax policy has a significant and great effect only in large 
firms. 
The main conclusion is that in Spain, large firms in high-medium tech sectors 
are the companies that benefit most from tax incentives for innovation and those 
incentives do not have impact on SMEs, where the incentives are randomly dis-
tributed. Therefore, maybe the agencies responsible to stimulate the use of such 
incentives in order to foster the improvement of R&D private investment have 
to change the focus. For instance, it should be important reducing all the legal 
and administrative barriers that preclude SME to access and exploit the typical 
incentives of these policies.
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Table 4.—Probability of Using Tax Incentives, among Firms That Know about Them 
[Dependent variable: claim R&D deductions]
Total SMEs Large
Const.
D21-50*
D51-100*
D101-200*
D201-500 *
D> 500 *
DM-HS *
Financial stability*
Stable R&D firm*
(receive subsidies in 
2002)
Lack of R&D 
personnel*
Importance of quality 
improvements 
in production *
-1.80 (-5.4)
0.71 (2.4)
0.69 (2.1)
1.04 (3.4) 
0.94 (3.1)
0.72 (2.4)
0.11 (1.0)
0.30 (3.0) 
0.62 (3.9) 
0.69 (3.0) 
0.65 (2.3) 
-0.49 (-3.1) 
-0.40 (-3.1)
-0.9 (-3.0)
0.08 (0.4)
0.43 (2.9) 
0.45 (1.8)
1.73 (2.8) 
0.57 (1.0)
-0.80 (-3.2)
-0.48 (-2.5)
-0.9 (-3.8)
0.07 (0.5)
0.21 (1.5)
0.66 (3.2)
0.51 (2.0)
0.72 (2.2)
-0.38 (-1.8)
-0.34 (-1,8)
Number of obs.
Log-likelihood
Region of common 
support
914
-409.1
[0.018, 0.92]
518
-181.9
[0.023,0.96]
 
396
-231.33
[0.111,0.83]
*Note:  
dy
dx
 
is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; in parenthesis, t statistics 
robust to heteroscedaticity.
1
ˆ
 tindexB
Pˆ
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Table 5.—Probability of Using Tax Incentives, among Firms That Conduct 
R&D and Know about the Incentives
[Dependent variable: claim R&D deductions]
Total SMEs Large
Const.
D21-50*
D51-100*
D101-200*
D201-500*
D> 500*
DM-HS*
Financial stability*
Stable R&D firm*
(receive subsidies in 
2002)
Lack of R&D 
personnel*
Importance of quality 
improvements in 
production*
-1.30 (-2.7)
0.72 (1.5)
0.88 (1.7)
0.91 (1.8)
0.81 (1.7)
0.56 (1.1)
0.23 (1.7)
0.26 (2.2)
-
0.81 (3.5)
0.79 (2.7)
-0.42 (-2.1)
-0.31 (-1.9)
-0.80 (-2.3)
0.27 (1.1)
0.47 (2.2)
0.13 (0.5)
1.55 (2.4)
0.73 (1.2)
-0.05 (-0.2)
-0.46 (-1.8)
-1.10 (-3.9)
0.09 (0.6)
0.14 (0.9)
0.80 (3.4)
0.52 (2.0)
0.75 (2.2)
-0.63 (-2.3)
-0.19 (-0,8)
Number of obs.
Log-likelihood
Region of common 
support
487
-307.2
[0.120, 0.92]
171
-101.9
[0.169,0.97]
 
316
-194.6
[0.062,0.83]
*Note:  dy dx  is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; in parenthesis, t statistics 
robust to heteroscedaticity. 
1
ˆ
 tindexB
Pˆ
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Table 6.—Matching Estimators: Firms that Know about the Tax Incentives
Total SMEs Large
ATT (NNM)
N. Treated
N. Controls
0.35 (0.9)(1)
283
149
0.56 (0.9)(1)
101
61
0.84 (2.3)(1)
182
84
ATT (Kernel)
N. Treated
N. Controls
0.76 (3.2)(1)
283
149
0.53 (1.2)(1)
101
390
0.74 (2.6)
182
188
SATT
(NNM)
N. Treated
N. Controls
Percent of exact matching
Number of matches
0.67 (2.6)
283
615
100
4
0.87 (2.1)
101
417
100
4
0.68 (2.3)
182
198
100
4
SATC
(NNM)
N. Treated
N. Controls
Percent of exact matching
Number of matches
0.23 (1.1)
615
283
100
4
0.16 (0.7)
417
101
100
4
0.33 (1.2)
198
182
100
4
Note: (1) Bootstrap standard errors (n. reps: 100)
Table 7.—Matching Estimators: Firms that Conduct R&D and Know about 
the Tax Incentives 
Total SMEs Large
ATT (NNM)
N. Treated
N. Controls
0.12 (0.3)(1)
249
114
0.47 (0.8)(1)
81
42
0.68 (1.8)(1)
168
77
ATT (Kernel)
N. Treated
N. Controls
0.75 (2.6) (1)
249
231
0.63 (1.1) (1)
81
85
0.79 (2.6)
168
142
SATT
(NNM)
N. Treated
N. Controls
Percent of exact matching
Number of matches
0.84 (2.6)
249
220
100
4
0.76 (1.2)
81
87
100
4
0.82 (2.3)
182
131
100
4
SATC
(NNM)
N. Treated
N. Controls
Percent of exact matching
Number of matches
0.59 (2.0)
220
249
100
4
0.71 (1.3)
87
81
100
4
0.44 (1.2)
131
168
100
4
Note: (1) Bootstrap standard errors (n. reps: 100)
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Table 8.—Heckman’s Second Step (Structural Equation). Firms that Know 
about the Tax Incentives 
[Dependent variable: log (R&D technological effort)]
Total SMEs Large
D21-50*
D51-100*
D101-200*
D201-500*
D> 500*
DM-HS*
Financial stability*
Stable R&D firm*
Pˆ (receive subsidies in 2002)
Ln(                     )
Mill’s ratio
0.51 (0.9)
-0.09 (-0.2)
-0.33 (-0.6)
-0.60 (-1.2)
-0.72 (-1.2)
0.79 (4.2)
-0.18 (-1.0)
0.43 (1,2)
0.63 (2.0)
-0.43 (-2.1)
-0.97 (-3.3)
0.70 (2.2)
-0.48 (-1.6)
0.51 (1.7)
0.75 (1.2)
-0.18 (-0.6)
-0.60 (-2.5)
0.78 (3.0)
-0.08 (-0.4)
0.06 (0.2)
0.40 (1.0)
-0.78 (-2.4)
-1.71 (-5.2)
Number of obs.
Wald chi (free degrees)
243
134.8(19)
81
56.0(9) 
162
63.9(9)
Note:* dy dx  is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; in parenthesis, t statistics 
robust to heteroscedaticity. 
1
ˆ
 tindexB
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Table 9.—Heckman’s Second Step (Structural Equation). Firms that Conduct 
R&D and Know about the Tax Incentives
[Dependent variable: log (R&D technological effort]
Total SMEs Large
D21-50*
D51-100*
D101-200*
D201-500*
D> 500*
DM-HS*
Financial stability*
Stable R&D firm*
Pˆ (receive subsidies in 2002)
Ln(                     )
Mill’s ratio
0.30 (0.6)
-0.22 (-0.3)
-0.41 (-0.7)
-0.64 (-1.0)
-0.7 (-1.0)
0.75 (3.7)
-0.23 (-1.2)
0.71 (2.0)
0.49 (1.3)
-0.49 (-2.0)
-1.28 (-2.5)
0.67 (2.0)
-0.54 (-1.7)
0.71 (2.0)
0.67 (1.0)
-0.02 (-0.1)
-0.56 (-1.2)
0.77 (2.6)
-0.09 (-0.4)
0.25 (0.8)
0.32 (0.7)
-0.89 (-2.3)
-2.02 (-4.5)
Number of obs.
Wald chi (free degrees)
243
104.0(19)
81
42.2(9)
 
162
47.3(9)
Note: * dy dx  is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; in parenthesis, t statistics 
robust to heteroscedaticity. 
1
ˆ
 tindexB
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Table A.1.—Descriptive statistics
Variables
Total 
Firms That Perform 
R&D
Firms That Know 
Incentives
Media s.d. Media s.d. Media s.d.
D10-20*
D21-50*
D51-100*
D101-200*
D201-500*
D > 500*
DM-HS*
Financial stability >0.5*
Stable R&D firms*
Receive R&D subsidies in 2002*
B-index             
Lack of R&D personnel *
Importance of quality 
improvements in production*
R&D technological effort
0.22
0.27
0.10
0.10
0.20
0.12
0.21
0.38
0.30
0.09
0.41
0.68
0.43
0.41
0.44
0.30
0.30
0.40
0.32
0.41
0.48
0.46
0.29
0.14
0.47
0.50
0.04
0.13
0.08
0.12
0.38
0.25
0.33
0.41
0.81
0.25
0.45
0.14
0.17
0.19
0.34
0.28
0.32
0.48
0.43
0.47
0.49
0.40
0.44
0.21
0.35
0.38
0.12
0.21
0.10
0.12
0.27
0.18
0.25
0.41
0.44
0.15
0.42
0.53
0.31
0.32
0.41
0.30
0.33
0.44
0.38
0.44
0.49
0.50
0.36
0.17
0.50
0.46
1
ˆ
 tindex
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